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Executive summary
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold the Finnish part of the 
international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the 
Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2012 continued to 
demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. 
There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders’ declarations. STUK 
remarked on the nuclear safeguards accountancy system and procedures of one of the 
stakeholders in 2012, setting required actions to comply with procedures.
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear 
materials accountancy, control, security and the reporting of nuclear fuel cycle related 
activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities 
that use nuclear materials – often referred to as “licence holders” or “operators” – and 
the state authority. A licence holder shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the 
state authority shall provide the regulatory control to ensure that the licence holder fulfils 
the requirements. Also the control of non-nuclear technology holders and suppliers, to 
ensure the non-proliferation of sensitive technology, is a growing global challenge for all 
stakeholders. In the Finnish legislation all these stakeholders are dealt with as users of 
nuclear energy.
Finland has a significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland 
reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there are the 
VTT research reactor in Espoo and a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. 
Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the third reactor under construction at 
the Olkiluoto site are being imported and installed. The import licences are reviewed as 
applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their site visits to the construction 
site prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.
The construction of the fourth reactor at the Olkiluoto power plant and at a new nuclear 
power plant site Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, were authorised in 2010. The safeguards 
systems for these new reactors shall be designed together with facility design. In order 
to familiarise operators’ staff with the safeguards needs, the second general course for 
operators’ safeguards staff was arranged in March 2012. This continued the dialogue 
initiated in 2011 between the new and old operators, STUK, the Commission and the 
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IAEA to facilitate safeguards approaches at the new facilities. Similarly to the Olkiluoto 3 
reactor, the import licences for the new facilities are reviewed as applicable to ensure the 
peaceful use of the technology and sensitive information. Two meetings with the operators 
and the ministries responsible for import and export control were arranged in 2012.
The first IAEA inspections at the new material balance areas in the front end of the 
nuclear fuel cycle were carried out in 2012. Uranium may be economically extracted at the 
Talvivaara mine as one of the by-products of nickel, because the bioheapleaching technique 
developed for large nickel deposits makes the extraction of other metals from low grade 
ore economically viable. Currently, uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel at 
Harjavalta nickel refinery. Industrial scale mineral processing may start in 2013 after the 
nuclear licensing of the Talvivaara mine.
STUK maintains a central national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies 
that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish 
Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, the European Union’s legislation and international 
agreements. These tasks are performed to guarantee that Finland can assure itself and 
the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. 
In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system and the 
European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been 
reduced significantly due to the state-level integrated safeguards approach for Finland, 
which is in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is 
approximately 20. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did they 
present any required actions based on their inspections during 2012. By their nuclear 
materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its 
own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. STUK 
continues with 40 annual inspections and more than 60 inspections days.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the 
global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: 
STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide 
laboratories (RL07) in the CTBT International Monitoring Network (IMS). The main task 
of the FiNDC is to inspect data received from the International Monitoring System and 
to inform the national authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of 
a nuclear weapons test. The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s 
organisation, together with the regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. 
An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and 
able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear 
test without getting detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common 
endeavour so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
STUK-B 157
5
The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2012 was 
focused on nuclear materials control, in particular in the back end of the fuel cycle. This 
was partly due to the need to regulate the construction of the final disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site. The application for the licence for the 
disposal facility, which consists of the encapsulation plant and the geological repository, 
was submitted in 2012 to the Government. In addition, STUK contributed to educational 
workshops and training courses for authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: 
countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in co-operation with the 
IAEA. STUK and the Finnish Customs continued the joint multi-year border monitoring 
development project. The project covers customs officers training and the updating of 
technical equipment and of operational procedures.
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Nuclear non-proliferation is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear materials and nuclear ener-
gy, globally. In order for Finland to have a nuclear 
industry, most of which consists of nuclear energy 
production, it must be ensured that nuclear ma-
terials, equipment, and technology are used only 
for their declared, peaceful purposes. The basis for 
nuclear safeguards is the national system for the 
regulatory control of nuclear materials and activi-
ties. Nuclear safeguards are an integral part of nu-
clear safety and nuclear security and they are ap-
plied both to large and medium-size nuclear indus-
try and to small-scale nuclear material activities. 
Along with the safeguards, the regulatory process 
for nuclear non-proliferation includes transport 
control, export control, border control, internation-
al cooperation and conventions, and monitoring 
compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT).
In Finland, STUK is the competent author-
ity regarding the implementation of nuclear non-
proliferation. In 2012 the regulatory framework 
for nuclear and radiation safety was reviewed by 
an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) 
mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). The IRRS review was ordered by the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy (MEE). 
The review recommendations guided also the new 
Director General of STUK, Mr. Tero Varjoranta, 
appointed for the 7 year period beginning from 
1 February 2012. After the IRRS review, on 30 
November 2012, a new STUK strategy for the pe-
riod of 2013 – 2017 was announced. The new strat-
egy will not affect much the mandatory implemen-
tation of non-proliferation control at STUK, but it 
gives a good framework for the interaction between 
nuclear safety, security and safeguards. In parallel 
1 Nuclear non-proliferation 
implementation in Finland
to this, STUK regulations are under renovation 
and are scheduled to be issued during 2013. In 
the new STUK safeguards regulation, the require-
ments concerning nuclear material accountancy, 
safeguards procedures and the implementation of 
the Additional Protocol will be merged in one up-
dated regulation. This will instruct all stakehold-
ers in the Finnish nuclear field on how to comply 
with the current national and international safe-
guards regulations.
1.1 International safeguards 
agreements and national legislation
Nuclear safeguards are based on international 
agreements, the most important and extensive of 
which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). 
The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) is the basis 
for the nuclear safeguards system of the European 
Union (EU). Finland is bound by both of these trea-
ties, and also has several bilateral agreements in 
the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. When 
Finland joined the EU, the bilateral agreements 
with Australia, Canada and the USA were partly 
substituted by the corresponding Euratom agree-
ments (see Appendix 3 for the relevant legislation).
Finland was the first state where an 
INFCIRC¹/153-type nuclear Safeguards Agreement 
with the IAEA entered into force (INFCIRC/155, 9 
February 1972). When Finland joined the EU (1 
January 1995), this agreement was suspended and 
subsequently the Safeguards Agreement between 
the non-nuclear weapon Member States of the 
EU, the Euratom, and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) 
¹  INFCIRC = IAEA Information Circulars
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entered into force in Finland, on 1 October 1995. 
Finland signed the Additional Protocol (AP) to 
the INFCIRC/193 in Vienna on 22 September 
1998, with the other EU Member States, and rati-
fied it on 8 August 2000. The Additional Protocol 
entered into force on 30 April 2004, when all the 
EU Member States had ratified it. The scope and 
mandate for Euratom nuclear safeguards are de-
fined in the European Commission Regulation No. 
302/2005.
After Finland joined EU as a Member State, 
and therefore joined the Euratom nuclear safe-
guards, a comprehensive national safeguards sys-
tem was still maintained. The basic motivation for 
this is the responsibility assumed by Finland for 
its nuclear safeguards and nuclear security under 
the obligations of the NPT.
The national nuclear safeguards derive their 
mandate and scope from the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree. These were amended dur-
ing 2008 as a result of the general constitution-
based renewal of the Finnish nuclear legislation 
system. The operator’s obligation to have a nu-
clear material accountancy system and the right 
of STUK to oversee the planning and generation 
of design information for new facilities was intro-
duced from STUK regulations to the Decree.
As stipulated by the Act, STUK issues de-
tailed regulations on safety and security (the YVL 
Guides) that apply to the use of nuclear energy. 
The YVL Guides most relevant to nuclear safe-
guards are:
•	Control of nuclear fuel and other nuclear mate-
rials required in the operation of nuclear power 
plants (Guide YVL 6.1)
•	The national system of accounting for and con-
trol of nuclear materials (Guide YVL 6.9)
•	Reports to be submitted on nuclear materials 
(Guide YVL 6.10).
All STUK YVL Guides are under renovation. The 
guides relevant to safeguards shall be merged into 
one joint new guide. The draft version has already 
been communicated to the stakeholders. The new 
guides shall be issued by the end of 2012.
Nuclear materials control applies to:
•	 nuclear	 material	 (special	 fissionable	 material	
and source material)
•	 nuclear	dual	use	items	(non-nuclear	materials,	
components, equipment and data suitable for 
producing nuclear energy or nuclear weapons 
as specified in INFCIRC/254, Part 1)
•	 licence	 holders’	 activities,	 expertise,	 prepared-
ness and competence
•	 R&D	activities	related	to	the	nuclear	fuel	cycle
•	 nuclear	security,	and
•	 safeguards	 for	 the	 final	 disposal	 of	 spent	 nu-
clear fuel.
1.2 Parties of the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system
The main parties involved in the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system are the authorities and the li-
cence holders. Undistributed responsibility for the 
safety, security and safeguards of the use of nucle-
ar energy is on the licence holder. It is the responsi-
bility of STUK as the competent state authority to 
ensure that the licence holders comply with the re-
quirements of the law and the nuclear safeguards 
agreements. To complement the national effort, 
international control is necessary to demonstrate 
credibility and the proper functioning of the na-
tional safeguards system.
1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsi-
ble for national non-proliferation policy and inter-
national agreements. The MFA is responsible for 
the export licensing of nuclear materials and other 
nuclear dual use items including sensitive nuclear 
technology. The Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (MEE) is the highest authority for the 
management and control of nuclear energy. MEE 
is responsible for the legislation related to nuclear 
energy and it is also the competent authority men-
tioned in the Euratom Treaty. Also other minis-
tries, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Defence contribute to the efficient func-
tioning of the national nuclear safeguards system.
STUK-B 157
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1.2.2 STUK
As per the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK is 
responsible for maintaining the national nuclear 
safeguards system in order to prevent the prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons. STUK regulates the 
licence holders’ activities and ensures that the 
obligations of international agreements concern-
ing the peaceful use of nuclear materials are met. 
Regulatory control by STUK includes the posses-
sion, use, production, transfer (national and in-
ternational), handling, storage, transport, export 
and import of nuclear materials and nuclear dual 
use items. STUK is in charge of Finland’s approval 
and consultation process for IAEA and European 
Commission inspectors. STUK approves an inspec-
tor as long as there are no such issues related to 
the person in question that might adversely affect 
nuclear safety or security at Finnish facilities or 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The new 
inspector requests are sent for comments to the op-
erators that hold construction or operating licences 
for nuclear facilities. If STUK cannot approve an 
inspector, it assigns the approval process to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy.
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK (see Figure 1 for the organisa-
tional chart and Figure 12 for the staff) cover all 
typical measures of a State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and 
many other activities besides. STUK reviews the 
licence holders’ reports (operational notifications, 
inventory reports), inspects their accountancy, fa-
cilities and transport arrangements on site, and 
performs system audits. Office work constitutes 
90% of the inspection effort. Most of the working 
hours are subject to a charge to the users of nucle-
ar energy (see Figure 13 for the distribution of the 
compiled working days). STUK runs a verification 
programme for nuclear activities to assess the com-
pleteness and correctness of the declarations by 
the licence holders. Nuclear safeguards on the na-
tional level are closely linked with other functions 
of nuclear materials control and non-proliferation: 
licensing, export control, border control, transport 
Security Technology
Nuclear Security
Nuclear Materials Section
Figure 1. Several departments and independent units of STUK cooperate under the non-proliferation framework.
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control, combating illicit trafficking, the physical 
protection of nuclear materials, and monitoring 
compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT) – all duties of the STUK 
Nuclear Materials Section. Nuclear safety and 
particularly nuclear security objectives are closely 
complemented by safeguards objectives. Therefore, 
the research, development and regulatory units 
in the fields of safety, security and safeguards 
at STUK cooperate under the non-proliferation 
framework.
1.2.3 Licence holders
The essential parts of the national nuclear safe-
guards system are the licence holders, in nuclear 
terminology often called the operators. They per-
form key functions of the national safeguards sys-
tem: control of the authentic source data of their 
nuclear materials and accountancy of nuclear ma-
terials at the facility level for each of their material 
balance areas (MBA). Each licence holder has to 
operate its safeguards system in accordance with 
its own nuclear materials handbook. The handbook 
is a part of the facility’s quality system and is re-
viewed and approved by STUK.
With the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
submitted by a licence holder as groundwork, 
the European Commission shall adopt particu-
lar safeguards provisions (PSP) for that licence 
holder. PSP are to be drawn taking into account 
operational and technical constraints and in close 
consultation with both the person or undertaking 
concerned and the relevant member state. Until 
PSP are adopted, the person or undertaking shall 
apply the general provisions of the Commission 
regulation No 302/2005.
99.8% of all nuclear materials in Finland reside 
at the nuclear power plants (NPP). The amounts of 
nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland 
in 1992–2010 are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
Fortum (MBA WL0V)
Fortum is a partly state-owned energy company, 
one of the largest in the Nordic countries. Fortum 
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Figure 3. Plutonium in spent nuclear fuel in Finland in 1994–2012.
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Figure 2. Uranium accumulation in Finland in 1994–2012.
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operates power plants of several types, nuclear 
among others.
The nuclear power plant of Fortum Power and 
Heat is located on the Hästholmen Island in 
Loviisa on the south-east coast of Finland. This 
first NPP to have been built in Finland hosts 
two power reactor units: Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. 
Loviisa 1 started its electricity production in 1977 
and Loviisa 2 in 1980. These two units share com-
mon fresh and spent fuel storages and for nuclear 
safeguards accountancy purposes the whole NPP 
is counted as one material balance area (MBA code 
WL0V). The electricity generated by the Loviisa 
NPP constitutes circa 10% of the whole electricity 
production in Finland.
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP has 
been imported from the Soviet Union / Russian 
Federation. The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP was 
returned to the Soviet Union / Russian Federation 
until 1996 and since then the spent fuel has been 
stored in the interim storage due to a change in the 
Finnish nuclear legislation, which today forbids, 
in general, the import and export of nuclear waste 
including spent fuel.
The Loviisa NPP site (SSFLOV1), as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol, comprises 
the entire Hästholmen Island and extends to the 
main gate on the continent. Particular Safeguards 
Provisions for the Loviisa NPP, which define the 
European Commission’s nuclear safeguards pro-
cedures for the facility, have been in force since 
1998. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards 
Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared 
for the Loviisa NPP.
Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS and W0L3)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and oper-
ates a nuclear power plant on the Olkiluoto Island 
in Eurajoki on the west coast of Finland. The 
Olkiluoto NPP consists of two nuclear power reac-
tor units, Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, and an in-
terim spent fuel storage. Olkiluoto 1 was connected 
to the electricity grid in 1978 and Olkiluoto 2 in 
1980. The Olkiluoto NPP contributes circa 16% of 
the whole electricity production in Finland. At the 
Olkiluoto NPP there are three active material bal-
ance areas (MBA codes W0L1, W0L2, W0LS).
Presently, the uranium in TVO’s nuclear fuel 
is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian 
origin. This uranium is enriched in the Russian 
Federation or in the EU and the fuel assemblies 
are manufactured in Spain and Sweden.
The Finnish Government granted a licence for 
constructing a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 3, on 
17 February 2005. As a part of the licensing pro-
cess, TVO’s plan for arranging the necessary meas-
ures for preventing the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons was approved by STUK. The construction 
and assembly work of the reactor unit is under 
way. The European Commission has assigned the 
MBA code W0L3 for Olkiluoto 3. The initial criti-
cality of the reactor is scheduled for 2014.
New nuclear facilities were granted by the 
Government on 6 May 2010. One of these was the 
Olkiluoto 4 reactor. The geotechnical site char-
acterisation works at the Olkiluoto 4 site began 
immediately in 2010. The selection of the vendor 
and the supply organisation shall take place in 
the near future. Although the reactor type has not 
been specified yet, TVO submitted the preliminary 
basic technical characteristics (BTC) in November 
2012 in order to obtain the MBA code W0L4 for 
future correspondence.
TVO owns most of the area of the Olkiluoto 
Island, but the NPP site (SSFOLK1), as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol, comprises 
currently the fenced areas around the reactor units, 
the spent fuel storage and the storage for low and 
intermediate level waste as well as the Olkiluoto 3 
construction site. Particular Safeguards Provisions 
for the Olkiluoto NPP have been in force since 
2007. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards 
Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared 
for the Olkiluoto NPP.
VTT FiR1 research reactor (MBA WRRF)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located 
at facilities other than nuclear power plants. The 
most significant of those facilities is the VTT re-
search reactor FiR1 (MBA code WRRF), located in 
Otaniemi, Espoo. The research reactor was the first 
nuclear reactor built in Finland at the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT). It reached criti-
cality on 27 March 1962. On 12 July 2012 the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy and 
VTT announced the plan to close down the reactor 
and to start the actions needed for decommission-
ing.
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define 
14
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the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards 
procedures for the facility have been in force for 
VTT FiR1 from 1998. The Facility Attachment of 
the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not 
been prepared for the research reactor.
The VTT FiR1 site (SSFVTT1), as per the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol, consists of 
the whole building around the research reactor, 
although there are non-nuclear companies and 
university premises in the same building.
STUK (MBA WFRS)
Small quantities of nuclear materials are stored 
by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK), mainly materials no longer in 
use and hence taken into STUK’s custody. STUK 
was founded in 1958 and is located at its cur-
rent premises in Roihupelto, Helsinki since 1994. 
The STUK MBA (WFRS) consists of the STUK 
headquarters and the “Central interim storage for 
small-user radioactive waste” at the Olkiluoto NPP 
site.
The STUK site (SSFSTUK), as per the require-
ments of the Additional Protocol, consists of the 
whole building where STUK’s headquarters are 
located in Helsinki, but non-STUK premises in the 
building are excluded. The storage at Olkiluoto is 
included in the NPP’s site declaration.
The University of Helsinki, Laboratory 
of Radiochemistry (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of Helsinki (HYRL) uses small amounts of nuclear 
materials. HYRL is located at the Kumpula univer-
sity campus in Helsinki.
The HYRL site (SSFHYRL), as per the require-
ments of the Additional Protocol, comprises the 
whole building that hosts the laboratory.
OM Group Kokkola Chemicals (MBA WKK0)
The OM Group (OMG) Kokkola Chemicals facility 
does not use nuclear materials as such. However, 
the by-products of their cobalt purification process 
contain uranium, which qualifies these by-products 
as nuclear material. OMG Kokkola Chemicals has 
an operation licence for producing, storing and han-
dling nuclear material. OMG Kokkola Chemicals is 
located on the west coast of Finland.
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta (MBA WNNH)
Norilsk Nickel operates the nickel refining plant 
at Harjavalta in western Finland. The plant was 
commissioned in 1959, expanded in 1995 and again 
in 2002. Norilsk Nickel Finland became a part 
of the Russian-based Norilsk Nickel as a result 
of the OM Group’s nickel business acquisition in 
2007. Norilsk Nickel’s Harjavalta refinery employs 
a technique of sulphuric acid leaching of nickel 
products. The uranium residuals will be extracted 
from the nickel products from the Talvivaara mine. 
In March 2010 STUK granted a licence to extract 
less than 10 tons of uranium per year. The Norilsk 
Nickel company submitted the basic technical 
characteristics (BTC) to the European Commission 
in December 2010.
Other nuclear material holders
There are about ten minor nuclear material hold-
ers in Finland. One of them is an actual mate-
rial balance area: the University of Jyväskylä, 
Department of Physics (JYFL, MBA code WDPJ), 
but in fact the nuclear material at JYFL has 
been derogated and exempted by the European 
Commission and the IAEA. Other minor nuclear 
material holders are members of a Catch-All-MBA 
(CAM), for the purposes of international nuclear 
safeguards. Most of these have depleted uranium 
as radiation shielding material.
New operators
The Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. mining company an-
nounced on 9 February 2010 its interest in inves-
tigating the recovery of uranium as a separate 
product from its sulphide ore body. The Talvivaara 
deposits in eastern Finland comprise one of the 
largest known sulphide nickel resources in Europe. 
The bioheapleaching technique developed for the 
deposits makes the extraction of metals from low 
grade ore economically viable. Therefore, in addi-
tion to nickel, zinc, copper and cobalt also uranium 
may be economically extracted and processed at 
the site. The company has submitted licence appli-
cations in accordance with the mining and nuclear 
energy legislation in order to recover uranium. The 
Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) was submit-
ted to the European Commission in 2010, and the 
MBA code WTAL is assigned for the future ura-
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nium extraction plant. The environmental impact 
assessment was carried out in 2010. The produc-
tion of uranium is expected to start during 2013 if 
all the relevant licences are granted.
The Fennovoima company announced on 5 
October 2011 its decision to locate their new nu-
clear power plant on the Hanhikivi peninsula at 
Pyhäjoki, located on the coast of the Bay of Bothnia. 
Fennovoima is doing preparatory works with ven-
dor candidates. In 2011 Fennovoima submitted bid 
invitations to Areva and Toshiba and the bids were 
received in January 2012. Fennovoima will select 
the plant supplier in 2013. The construction licence 
application is expected to be submitted within 
five years after the ratification of the Decision-in-
Principle in summer 2010. The Hanhikivi site shall 
be declared as the construction proceeds from a 
virgin green site to the nuclear power plant.
Posiva (MBA W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the fi-
nal disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It is 
owned by TVO and Fortum. Posiva has been exca-
vating an underground rock characterisation facil-
ity called “Onkalo” in Eurajoki since 2004, and thus 
preparing for the construction of the final disposal 
facility. While neither a nuclear licence holder nor 
a nuclear material holder yet, Posiva and its activi-
ties are highly relevant to the national safeguards 
system because Posiva is foreseen to develop a new 
type of facility, the geological repository, where the 
nuclear material cannot be re-verified once it has 
been encapsulated and emplaced. In the IAEA safe-
guards approaches it has been suggested that the 
geological formation should be under safeguards 
during the whole lifetime of the underground facil-
ity. Therefore, Posiva has been required to develop a 
non-proliferation handbook, such as a nuclear mate-
rials handbook, to describe Posiva’s safeguards pro-
cedures and reporting system already before becom-
ing a nuclear material holder. The preliminary basic 
technical characteristics (BTC) have been provided 
and the European Commission has already as-
signed the MBA code W0LF for Onkalo. The facility 
without nuclear materials but having the BTC con-
stitutes a site according to the Additional Protocol. 
The Posiva site (SSFPOS1) covers the fenced area 
around the buildings supporting the repository con-
struction. By the end of 2012, Posiva submitted to 
the Government an application to construct the fi-
nal disposal facility, which will consist of the encap-
sulation plant and the geological repository.
Other stakeholders
Non-nuclear technology holders and suppliers that 
serve nuclear and other industry are obliged to 
take care that non-proliferation sensitive tech-
nology does not get into the hands of unauthor-
ized non-state actors and thereby contribute to 
nuclear proliferation. The introduction of the 
Additional Protocol (1996) extended the scope of 
safeguards to the non-proliferation control of nu-
clear programmes and fuel cycle related activities 
in Member States around the world. Additionally, 
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1540 (April 2004) requires every State to ensure 
that export controls, border controls, material ac-
countancy and physical protection are efficiently 
taken care of and calls all States to develop appro-
priate ways to work with and inform industry and 
the public regarding their obligations. The control 
of non-nuclear technology holders and suppliers to 
ensure the non-proliferation and peaceful use of 
sensitive technology and dual-use items is a grow-
ing global challenge for all stakeholders.
Nuclear safeguards are commonly seen as the 
traditional nuclear material accountancy and re-
porting system, the main stakeholders of which are 
the international, regional and local authorities, 
and the operators. In accordance with the extended 
non-proliferation regime and the amendments to 
the Finnish legislation, the companies that have 
activities defined in the Additional Protocol or 
have customers for dual-use equipment abroad are 
under strengthened reporting requirements and 
export control.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom 
safeguards in Finland
The IAEA and the European Commission nuclear 
safeguards both have their separate mandates to 
operate in Finland. These two international inspec-
torates have agreed on cooperation, which aims to 
reduce undue duplication of effort. Year 2009 in-
troduced a significant change from the traditional 
safeguards procedures in Finland as the imple-
mentation of integrated safeguards began on 15 
October 2008.
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Integrated safeguards include traditional nu-
clear safeguards as per INFCIRC/193, and safe-
guards activities in accordance with the Additional 
Protocol, fitted together. While this should not lead 
to an increase in inspections, it should enable the 
IAEA to assure itself of the absence of undeclared 
nuclear activities in a state. In practice, the num-
ber of IAEA routine interim inspections decreases. 
In contrast to this, the IAEA will additionally per-
form 1–3 unannounced or short notice inspections 
per year in a state that has a number and type of 
nuclear installations that resembles the situation 
in Finland.
The operators report to the Commission as re-
quired per Commission Safeguards regulation No 
302/2005. It is the Commission’s task to audit the 
licence holders’ accounting and reporting systems. 
Both the Commission and STUK have increased 
preparedness for short notice and unannounced 
inspections and complementary access (abbrevi-
ated SNUICA). Every weekday, one of STUK’s 
inspectors is prepared to attend a possible IAEA 
inspection.
The number of IAEA and Euratom routine 
inspections decreased significantly in 2009, as 
defined in the state-level safeguards approach 
for Finland, which was negotiated during 2007 
and 2008. The time difference between the unan-
nounced inspections at the two spent fuel storages 
(i.e. 2 hours for Loviisa and 48 hours for Olkiluoto) 
was due to the difference in the surveillance at the 
storages and reasonable access time for a STUK 
inspector. STUK continues with annual routines 
with approximately 40 inspections, which enables 
the reduction in the effort of the international in-
spectorates.
1.4 Verified declarations for 
state evaluations
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials and 
activities are the basis for the state evaluation by 
the IAEA under the obligations of the Additional 
Protocol. In Finland, the state has delegated its re-
sponsibility for these declarations to STUK. STUK 
has been nominated a site representative, as per 
European Commission regulation No 302/2005. 
STUK collects, inspects and reviews the relevant 
information and then submits the compiled decla-
rations timely to the Commission and the IAEA.
In Finland, there are currently six sites in the 
sense of the Additional Protocol: the two nuclear 
power plant (NPP) sites in Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
respectively, the geological repository site in 
Olkiluoto, and three minor sites: the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT), the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of 
Helsinki (HYRL). STUK reviews and verifies the 
correctness and completeness of the information 
about the sites provided by the stakeholders.
STUK reviews annually the information about 
research and development activities that might be 
eligible for declaration, as well as activities speci-
fied in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. STUK 
maintains the information on general plans related 
to the nuclear fuel cycle for the next 10 years and 
keeps account of the exports of specified equipment 
and non-nuclear materials, as listed in Annex II of 
the Additional Protocol.
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a 
state nuclear safeguards system to ensure that nu-
clear materials and activities within the state are 
in accordance with the licence holders’ declarations 
and that there are no undeclared activities. Such 
methods can provide information on the identity 
IAEA regular inspections:
Facilities at nuclear power plants (NPP):
•	 Physical	Inventory	Verification	(PIV)	/	Design	
Information	Verification	(DIV)	1/year
•	 Random	Interim	Inspection	(RII)	at	48	h	 
notification	(at	least	1/year)
Spent fuel storages at NPPs
•	 PIV/DIV	1/year
•	 RII	at	2h	i.e.	Unannounced	Inspection	
(UI)/48 h	notification	(at	least	1/year)
Research reactor and locations outside facilities 
(LOF)
•	 PIV/DIV	1/4–6	years
New reactors, under construction
•	 DIV	and	PIV	later	like	at	the	NPPs
Repository (Onkalo), under construction
•	 PIV/DIV	most	likely	as	at	spent	fuel	storages 
Complementary	accesses	at	2/24	h	notification	to	
verify declared activities or to detect undeclared 
activities.
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of the nuclear materials and confirm that licence 
holders’ declarations are correct and complete with 
respect to e.g. the enrichment of uranium, the 
burnup, and the cooling time of nuclear fuel. The 
technical analysis methods in use are non-destruc-
tive assay (NDA), environmental sampling and 
satellite imagery.
STUK employs three NDA methods for verify-
ing spent nuclear fuel. One method lends itself for 
rapid scanning, as the detector is mounted on the 
fuel transfer machine and the fuel elements can be 
measured from above the fuel pond without moving 
the elements. The other two methods, on the other 
hand, allow confirming with greater confidence the 
correctness of the declared burnup and the cooling 
time. With the most precise method, the absence 
of a fuel pin or pins from a fuel element can be 
discovered. STUK reports to the Commission and 
the IAEA about the NDA measurement campaigns.
All nuclear materials leave traces of their iden-
tity, source of origin and treatment. Safeguards en-
vironmental samples (ES) are used to investigate 
these traces, which provide further information for 
establishing whether the nuclear activities are in 
accordance with the declarations. In the Finnish 
nuclear safeguards system environmental samples 
are collected as surface swipes. The IAEA may col-
lect independent environmental samples during its 
complementary access type of inspections.
Satellite imagery is applied to verify the site 
declaration in accordance with the Additional 
Protocol. Timely imagery is used to monitor dif-
ferent kinds of activities at the sites or elsewhere 
in Finland. STUK contributes to the work of the 
satellite image analysts of the IAEA and the 
Commission.
1.5 Export/import control and 
licensing as elements of 
nuclear non-proliferation
As per the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, in addition 
to nuclear materials also other nuclear fuel cycle 
related activities are under regulatory control. A 
licence is required for the possession, transfer and 
import of components, equipment, materials and 
technology suitable for producing nuclear energy 
(nuclear dual use items).
The list of these other items is based on the 
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) Guidelines 
(INFCIRC/254 Part 1). The licence holder is re-
quired to provide STUK with a list of the above 
mentioned items annually. Moreover, the export, 
import, and transfer of such items shall be report-
ed to STUK.
Mining and mineral processing operations that 
aim to produce uranium or thorium are also under 
nuclear safeguards and regulatory nuclear safety 
control. In order to carry out these activities a 
national licence and an accounting system to keep 
track of the amounts of uranium and thorium are 
required. A national licence is also required to ex-
port and import uranium or thorium ore, and these 
activities are to be authorised by the Euratom 
Supply Agency and the European Commission. 
These mining and milling activities and production 
shall be reported to STUK, the Commission and to 
the IAEA.
Finland’s export control system is based on 
the EU Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 
5  May 2009, which sets up a Community regime 
for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and 
transit of dual-use items. The export of Nuclear 
Suppliers’ Group (NSG) Part 1 and Part 2 items 
is regulated by the Finnish Act on the Control of 
Exports of Dual Use Goods. The licensing authority 
is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. An authorisa-
tion is required to export nuclear items outside the 
European Union. A licence is also required for EU 
internal transfers of NSG Part 1 items, excluding 
non-sensitive nuclear materials.
1.6 The regulatory control of transport 
covers nuclear materials
The requirements for the transport of radioactive 
material are set in the Finnish regulations on the 
transport of dangerous goods. The requirements 
are based on the IAEA safety standard Regulations 
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 
SSR-6, and their purpose is to protect people, the 
environment and property from the harmful effects 
of radiation during transports of radioactive mate-
rial. Based on these regulations, STUK is the com-
petent national authority for the regulatory control 
regarding the transport of radioactive material.
In addition to the dangerous goods transport 
regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act sets 
specific requirements for the transport of nuclear 
material and nuclear waste: generally a licence 
granted by STUK is needed for such a transport. 
Usually the transport licences are granted for a 
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fixed period, typically for a few years. A transport 
plan and a transport security plan approved by 
STUK are mandatory for each transport of nuclear 
material or nuclear waste. A certificate of nuclear 
liability insurance shall also be delivered to STUK 
before the transport. Furthermore, a package may 
be used for the transport of fissile nuclear material 
only after the package design has been approved 
by STUK.
1.7 STUK’s contribution to international 
safeguards development
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by its nature, an in-
ternational domain. STUK therefore actively par-
ticipates in international nuclear safeguards re-
lated cooperation and development efforts.
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has nominated Finnish experts to its commit-
tees and most of the working groups. STUK partic-
ipates in the ESARDA Executive Board meetings 
and in several working groups.
Upon request by the IAEA, STUK’s experts 
have contributed to the IAEA’s international mis-
sions. The current experience obtained from the 
planning, design and construction of new nuclear 
facilities in Finland has increased the number of 
requests to participate in different kinds of inter-
national co-operation.
STUK keeps close contacts with the respective 
Nordic authority organisations. The development 
of the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geologi-
cal repositories deepens the cooperation between 
Finland and Sweden.
The Finnish Safeguards Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards, FINSP, was established 
in 1988. The aim of the FINSP is to provide the 
IAEA with educational and technical support in 
the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
The FINSP is funded by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs and implemented by STUK.
1.8 The Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. The CTBT bans any nuclear test explosions in 
any environment. This ban is aimed at constrain-
ing the development and qualitative improvement 
of nuclear weapons, including also the develop-
ment of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New York on 24 September 1996. The CTBT 
will enter into force after it has been ratified by 
the 44 states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states 
participated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament and possess nuclear power or 
research reactors. On 12 February 2012 Indonesia 
ratified the CTBT, bringing the number of missing 
Annex 2 state ratifications down to eight.
A global verification regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. The 
verification regime consists of the following ele-
ments: the International Monitoring System (IMS), 
a consultation and clarification process, on-site in-
spections and confidence-building measures.
Finland signed the CTBT on its day of opening 
in 1996 and ratified it less than three years later. 
Figure 4. The Finnish CTBT organisation.
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In addition to complying with the basic require-
ment of the CTBT of not to carry out any nuclear 
weapons tests, Finland actively takes part in the 
development of the verification regime.
In the CTBT framework, the Finnish national 
authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK 
has two roles: STUK operates the Finnish National 
Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the sixteen radio-
nuclide laboratories in the IMS (RL07). The most 
important task of the FiNDC is to inspect data 
received from the IMS and inform the national au-
thority about any indications of a nuclear test ex-
plosion. The radionuclide laboratory contributes to 
the IMS by providing support in the radionuclide 
analyses and in the quality control of the radio-
nuclide station network. The third major national 
collaborator is the Institute of Seismology at the 
University of Helsinki, which runs an IMS seismol-
ogy station (PS17 in Lahti), and provides analysis 
of waveform IMS data (Figure 4).
1.9 Nuclear safeguards and security
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory 
control of nuclear and radiological safety, security 
and safeguards. All these three regimes have a 
common goal: the protection of people, the society, 
the environment, and future generations from the 
harmful effects of ionising radiation. As nuclear 
security aims to protect nuclear facilities, nuclear 
material and other radioactive material from un-
lawful activities, it is clear that the majority of the 
activities that aim at non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, nuclear materials and sensitive nuclear 
technology contribute to nuclear security. Physical 
and information security measures at nuclear fa-
cilities and for nuclear materials contribute also 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) Status (31 December 2012)
•	 CTBT	Member	States	 183
•	 Total	Ratifications	 157
•	 Annex	2	Ratifications	 36
to non-proliferation by providing detection and 
delay of and response to security events. On the 
other hand, nuclear material accountancy and con-
trol measures may supplement security measures 
through a deterrence effect. Within STUK’s organi-
sation, some of its nuclear security related tasks 
fall – solely or partly – under the duties of the 
nuclear non-proliferation process and the Nuclear 
Materials Section:
•	 national	system	 for	 the	control	of	nuclear	ma-
terials and nuclear dual use items; the system 
facilitates international nuclear safeguards ac-
tivities in Finland
•	 regulatory	 control	 of	 the	 transport	 of	 nuclear	
materials and nuclear waste
•	 import	and	export	control
•	 advice	 to	 the	 Finnish	 Customs	 on	 radiation	
monitoring at the borders, in concept develop-
ment and technical specifications; training for 
Customs officers
•	 participation	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 international	
nuclear safeguards and nuclear security com-
munities and working groups (IAEA, ESARDA, 
AQG, ITWG…)
•	 participation	 in	 STUK’s	 response	 in	 cases	 of	
radiological or nuclear incidents
•	 advice	to	the	Finnish	Customs	on	the	interpre-
tation of radiation detections at borders, more 
sophisticated on-site measurements and analy-
ses in response to border monitoring alarms
The Finnish regulatory system for nuclear security 
was audited by an IPPAS mission in 2009, followed 
by an IPPAS follow-up mission in 2012. One of the 
recommendations arising from the audit, namely 
the need for more detailed security requirements 
for minor holders of nuclear materials, was in the 
Nuclear Materials Section’s area of responsibility. 
As a result, the new YVL Guide for nuclear materi-
als control, under review since 2010 and expected 
to come into force in 2013, will contain more de-
tailed security requirements for these minor hold-
ers.
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2 Theme of the year 2012: 
new facilities
2.1 Bidding for new facilities
The preparatory work for the future power plants 
and the experience obtained from the continuing 
construction of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant 
have given STUK experience that is in the interest 
of the whole international nuclear community. 
Although the applicants for new power plants are 
requested to submit their nuclear construction 
licence applications within 5 years, the bidding 
phase of the new projects has pointed out the 
need to have regulations and control of nuclear 
technology and related restricted information in 
place already before the licensing of the future 
operator. In order to clarify the needs of the 
operators, STUK arranged two workshops between 
the operators and authorities, including both 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy (MEE). 
In particular, the Olkiluoto 3 construction project 
has given practical experience of import and export 
licensing procedures and the control of nuclear 
technology. In 2012 STUK issued 16 licences for 
the import, possession and/or transfer of nuclear 
technology.
2.2 Safeguards, security and 
safety in design
As a consequence of the 2010 Parliament 
authorisation of the three new nuclear facilities, 
STUK initiated negotiation with the operators, 
the European Commission and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prepare for the 
implementation of safeguards timely with the 
facility development in 2011. A second course on 
the implementation of safeguards was arranged 
at Helmiranta, near the Olkiluoto power plant on 
28 March 2012, in close cooperation with STUK, 
the Commission and the IAEA under the IAEA 
Safeguards-by-Design initiative (Figure 5). As a 
consequence, safeguards and security requirements 
in the design were included in an early phase of 
the bidding for the first time. With assistance from 
Finnish operators STUK experts also contributed 
to the IAEA symposium on safeguards-by-design 
in September 2012 and to the preparation of the 
IAEA guidance documents.
Several IAEA meetings during 2012 were 
focused on the interfaces and synergies of safety, 
security, and safeguards for nuclear newcomers – 
countries embarking on nuclear power programs 
– and countries actively building their nuclear 
infrastructures for expansion. It is widely 
acknowledged that there are known synergies as 
well as challenges between safety and security 
and between security and safeguards. It is most 
effective if all requirements for safety, security 
and safeguards are provided together during the 
design stage or as a part of the bid specifications to 
avoid separate requirements which might conflict 
with each others. The integration of the three S’s 
– safety, security and safeguards – optimises the 
site and plant design and reduces the chance for 
design changes or expensive retrofitting late in the 
construction process.
In the meetings regarding new nuclear 
programmes and the import and export of nuclear 
information and technology, STUK and the Finnish 
nuclear companies have realised that every expert 
needs to have a basic understanding of safety, 
security and safeguards to maintain expertise in 
the nuclear field. Because the Finnish stakeholders 
have experience of existing nuclear power plants 
and also new nuclear power programmes, it has 
been important to find the main synergies and 
interfaces between safety, security and safeguards 
and to share this understanding with newcomer 
states. This is demonstrated in Figure 6 as the 
Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA, which 
arranged a one-week course for nuclear newcomer 
states at STUK and at the Olkiluoto facilities.
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2.3 New STUK regulations
STUK continued with the annual meetings with 
the operators. Each power company was met twice 
and one common meeting in April 2012 was ar-
ranged at the IAEA in Vienna for all Finnish power 
companies. One of the topics in these meetings 
was preparing for the remote monitoring by the 
IAEA and the Commission and the data transmis-
sion that it requires, in such a manner that safety 
and security are not jeopardised. The status and 
content of the new STUK regulations were also 
discussed.
As a part of the extensive reformation work on 
the YVL guides, the safeguards requirements in 
former YVL 6.9 and YVL 6.10 have been compiled 
while also taking into account changes in safe-
guards since the late 1990s. New areas covered 
are e.g. the obligations and measures stemming 
from the Additional Protocol for the Safeguards 
Agreement and recent developments in the area. 
The new YVL Guide D.1 covers obligations and 
requirements to all users of nuclear energy in all 
phases of the nuclear fuel cycle. All stakeholders 
will have to describe their own safeguards system 
in written form (as a nuclear materials handbook) 
to ease their task of fulfilling their obligations and 
to guarantee the effective and comprehensive func-
tion of the national safeguards system. In the new 
guide there are also specific national requirements 
for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The new 
YVL Guide D.1 on safeguards is scheduled to enter 
into force in spring 2013.
2.4 Decommissioning and a 
new building at VTT
The Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) 
made two important decisions for the Finnish nu-
clear community during 2012. A new building for 
experimental nuclear research shall be built at 
the Espoo premises of VTT, but on the other hand, 
the old nuclear material testing laboratories will 
be demolished and the research reactor will be 
closed down. Both of these decisions will have long-
lasting effects, due to the need for permissions, 
contracts and environmental impact assessment. 
This affects also safeguards, as the nuclear mate-
rials have to be kept under the control of compe-
tent personnel at both facilities. Also the research 
and developments activities – even those not in-
cluding nuclear materials and manufacturing of 
fuel-cycle related items – have to be the under 
safeguards control, owing to the requirements in 
the Additional Protocol and possible import licence 
conditions and security requirements. In 2012 
these decisions and future changes did not yet af-
fect the formal declaration of VTT, because the 
builder, Senate Properties, a government owned 
enterprise responsible for managing the Finnish state’s 
property assets, had not yet made the decision to in-
vest in the new nuclear safety research centre. This 
project highlights how safeguards implementation 
requires continuous communication between the 
regulator, the operator and the other stakeholders 
in the nuclear fuel cycle.
Figure 5. The staff of Finnish operators participated 
actively in the safeguards-by-design training provided 
by STUK, the Commission and the IAEA.
Figure 6. Sharing experiences about nuclear pro-
grammes in Finland with the newcomer states.
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3 Safeguards activities in 2012
3.1 The regulatory control of 
nuclear materials
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures as in the past. Nuclear material inventories 
at the end of 2012 are shown in Tables 2 and 3 in 
Appendix 1. The development of inspections and 
inspection person days per Material Balance Area 
(MBA) is presented in Figures 7 and 8. Inspections 
by STUK, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and the European Commission in 2012 are 
presented in Appendix 2.
The application of integrated safeguards began 
in Finland on 15 October 2008. Thus, in the year 
2009 the number of the IAEA inspections was 
reduced from approximately 25 person days to 
15. Similarly, the Commission reduced its inspec-
tion activities significantly. In 2010 the number of 
inspection days rose somewhat due to the first in-
spections at the geological repository site, addition-
al inspection days at the Loviisa Nuclear Power 
Plant (NPP) and the increased number of random 
inspections in Finland. Since 2010, the number of 
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Figure 7. The number of inspections from 2006 to 2012.
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regular inspections remained at the same level, i.e. 
the current number of the annual IAEA inspection 
days is around 20 person days in Finland. In 2012 
there were a few additional inspections to Loviisa 
NNP owing to cask transfers during the mainte-
nance outage.
3.1.1 Declarations and approvals of 
new international inspectors
All the relevant licence holders sent their updated 
information for the national declaration, which 
is compiled by STUK, in time by 1 March 2012. 
STUK submitted Finland’s annual declaration up-
dates to the IAEA on 15 May 2012 as required. 
Additionally, STUK submitted the quarterly dec-
larations on exports in February, May, August and 
November.
In 2012, altogether 15 IAEA and 12 Commission 
new inspectors were approved to perform inspec-
tions at nuclear facilities in Finland.
3.1.2 The Loviisa nuclear power plant site
In 2012, STUK approved the update of the nuclear 
materials hand book at Fortum’s Loviisa NPP. The 
change of responsibilities between the person re-
sponsible for nuclear safeguards and his deputy 
was approved. In 2012 STUK granted the operat-
ing company Fortum one import licence for a de-
vice used in a nuclear reactor.
STUK inspected and verified the annual site 
declaration on 6 March 2012. The Commission 
joined this inspection to serve the containment 
and surveillance equipment and to verify the basic 
technical characteristics, i.e. the design informa-
tion.
The refuelling and extensive maintenance out-
age of the Loviisa 1 reactor unit, which is to be 
carried out every eight years, took place in the 
period 5 August – 29 September 2012, and the 
short routine outage of the Loviisa 2 reactor unit 
in the period 22 September – 13 October 2012. 
Owing to the new integrated safeguards approach 
for Finland, the IAEA and the Commission per-
formed a before Physical Inventory Taking (pre-
PIT) inspection with STUK before the outage, 
on 1 – 12 August 2012. Temporary surveillance 
cameras were installed in the reactor halls for the 
outage period, and removed during the Physical 
Inventory Verification (PIV) carried out after the 
outage, on 30 – 31 October 2012. During the out-
age and before the closing of each reactor, STUK 
identified the fuel assemblies in the reactor cores 
and item counted the loading ponds. The Loviisa 
1 core was inspected on 5 September 2012 and the 
Loviisa 2 core on 28 – 29 September 2012. During 
the outages, the cask transfer was inspected four 
times by the IAEA and the Commission. In addi-
tion to the PIV and the core controls, STUK carried 
out one routine inspection and two measurement 
campaigns. During the year STUK remarked the 
NPP on the need to maintain equipment needed to 
facilitate several operations, also those needed for 
safeguards inspections at the facility. The ageing of 
technology was addressed in general.
On the basis of its own assessment as well as of 
IAEA and Commission inspection results, STUK 
concluded that Fortum’s Loviisa NPP has complied 
with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2012.
3.1.3 The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant site
In 2012, STUK approved one new person to be ap-
pointed deputy for the person responsible for nu-
clear safeguards at the Olkiluoto NPP. During 2012 
STUK also granted to TVO nine import licences, 
four import and possession licences, one possession 
licence and three transfer licences. These covered 
the import of fresh nuclear fuel and nuclear dual 
use items, i.e. technology and instrumentation for 
the operating units and equipment for the new 
unit under construction.
The operating waste repository in Olkiluoto has 
been used since the year 1992 for the final disposal 
of low and medium level nuclear waste generated 
at the Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 plant units. The 
operating licence expires on 31 December 2051. 
TVO submitted to the Government in September 
2011 an application for the amendment of the 
terms of the operating licence of the operating 
waste repository. The Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy requested statements on the applica-
tion from several different Ministries and other 
authorities. On 22 November 2012 the Government 
granted TVO a licence amendment for the final 
disposal of low and medium level nuclear waste 
from the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construc-
tion in the operating waste repository in Olkiluoto. 
Also state-owned radioactive waste, such as radia-
tion sources used in hospitals and for educational 
purposes, can be emplaced in the operating waste 
repository in the future.
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The refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto 1 reactor unit took place in the period 
24 April –11 May 2012 and that of the Olkiluoto 
2 reactor unit in the period 27 May – 6 June 2012. 
The annual outages were brought forward due to 
the water leak detected in the main generator in 
April. Therefore, the IAEA and the Commission 
performed a pre-PIT inspection with STUK al-
ready on 30 April 2012, not before the outage, but 
before the opening of the core, which is essential 
for safeguards. The PIV was carried out after the 
outage on 12 – 14 June 2012.
During the refuelling and maintenance out-
age STUK identified the fuel assemblies in the 
reactor cores and verified and item counted the 
loading ponds before the reactors were closed. The 
Olkiluoto 1 reactor was inspected on 13 May 2012 
and the Olkiluoto 2 reactor on 3 June 2012.
The IAEA short notice random interim inspec-
tion addressed to the Olkiluoto NPP: on 13 April 
the Olkiluoto 1 unit was inspected and on 17 
October 2012 the spent fuel storage. At the time 
of the latter inspection, the spent fuel ponds were 
covered to protect the ponds from possible influ-
ence from the ongoing expansions works of the 
storage building. The covers of one of the ponds 
did not allow the access and verification of all of 
the seals. Thus, the verification of the seals is post-
poned. STUK carried out two additional routine 
inspections to the Olkiluoto site and the material 
balance areas (MBA) at the Olkiluoto NPP. The 
construction of the spent fuel storage enlargement 
restricts spent fuel transfer from the reactor build-
ings. This situation is expected to continue for few 
more years.
The construction of the new Olkiluoto 3 reactor 
(OL-3) has proceeded to such a stage that nuclear 
items are to be installed at the site. The main com-
ponents are under assembly and STUK’s regula-
tory control. TVO prepared a draft for the basic 
technical characteristics (BTC) of the new unit in 
2008. This first BTC was reviewed by STUK, the 
IAEA, and the Commission twice in 2008. Thus, 
the inspectorates have the possibility to plan the 
surveillance and containment measures in ad-
vance. During 2009, future actions were waiting 
for the advancement of the construction of the fuel 
handling buildings. The IAEA and the Commission 
visited the OL-3 construction site on 3 March 2010, 
27 April 2011 and on 6 September 2012 to adjust 
containment and surveillance instrumentation on 
site. The principal locations of cameras and control 
units were agreed to for the reactor building in 
2010 and for the fuel handling building in 2011. 
The commissioning of the OL-3 unit has been post-
poned several times, and the current estimate for 
commissioning is 2016.
The construction of the new Olkiluoto 4 reactor 
(OL-4) was authorised in 2010. The geotechnical 
works have started at the site, but the decision 
for the reactor type and the vendor organisation 
are still pending. Despite lacking these important 
details, TVO submitted the preliminary BTC to the 
Commission on 1 November 2012 and proposed 
the MBA code W0L4 for the new unit. This was 
confirmed by the Commission on 8 January 2013. 
The nuclear construction licence application with 
technical details is expected to be submitted within 
5 years after the Decision-in-Principle of July 2010.
On the basis of its own assessment as well as 
IAEA and Commission inspection results, STUK 
concluded that TVO’s Olkiluoto NPP has complied 
with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2012, 
although all of the seals at the spent fuel storage 
could not be accessed during the latest inspection.
3.1.4 The Pyhäjoki nuclear power plant project
The Government approved a Decisions-in-Principle 
in 2010 for the new operator Fennovoima to con-
struct a new nuclear power plant at a new site. 
The applicant was requested to submit their nu-
clear construction licence applications within 5 
years and to submit a plan for its nuclear waste 
management within 6 years. On 5 October 2011 
Fennovoima announced its decision to build the 
new nuclear power plant on Hanhikivi peninsula 
in Pyhäjoki. The facility construction may start 
after the licence is granted. Owing to this authori-
sation STUK initiated negotiations with the op-
erators and the Commission and the IAEA in 2011 
to prepare for the implementation of safeguards 
timely, together with the facility development. As a 
consequence the company could request the vendor 
organisations to facilitate safeguards implementa-
tion, e.g. improve proliferation resistance, nuclear 
material verification and surveillance at the future 
plant. In 2011 Fennovoima submitted bid invita-
tions to Areva and Toshiba and the bids were re-
ceived in January 2012. Fennovoima will select the 
plant supplier in 2013. The schedule of the whole 
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construction project will be specified in the plant 
contract. In the meanwhile Fennovoima created an 
organisation for safeguards and prepared for the 
implementation of safeguards. Their nuclear mate-
rials handbook is under preparation and the basic 
technical characteristics and the site declaration 
will be prepared and submitted after the selection 
of the supply organisation, reactor type and loca-
tion at the site.
One of the first steps in the construction process 
is the control of nuclear technology, e.g., sensitive 
information obtained from the bidding companies. 
During 2012 STUK granted Fennovoima two im-
port licences for the possession of nuclear technol-
ogy. Based on the meetings on the implementation 
of safeguards and the control of nuclear technol-
ogy with Fennovoima’s staff, STUK concludes that 
awareness and preparedness for safeguards proce-
dures are at an adequate level in the new organisa-
tion preparing for the new project.
3.1.5 The VTT FiR1 research reactor site
In 2012 STUK carried out two interim inspections 
to the research rector site of the VTT research cen-
tre. The site declaration and activities and internal 
control systems were reviewed on 7 February 2012 
March. Safeguards inspectors from STUK and the 
Commission verified the nuclear material inven-
tory of VTT on 6 September 2012. There were some 
inconsistencies in reporting but the nuclear mate-
rial inventory was concluded to be correct during 
the inspection. After the inspection, the reporting 
of small amounts and exchanges of small samples 
between research organisations on the Otaniemi 
University Campus was addressed by STUK and 
the Commission.
VTT submitted the operating licence application 
to the Government on 30 November 2010. During 
the handling process of the operating licence appli-
cation, there was a special focus on ensuring that 
the continued use of the research reactor meets 
specific safety requirements. In its statement on 
30 October 2011 STUK commented also the need 
for competences for the whole licensed period. On 8 
December 2011, the Government granted the oper-
ating licence for VTT research reactor FiR 1, until 
the end of 2023. However, in the beginning of 2012 
commercial medical use of the reactor met with fi-
nancial difficulties; and moreover, on 12 July 2012 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy and 
VTT announced that the research reactor will be 
closed down and preparatory works required for 
decommissioning will take place. On 4 December 
2012 STUK and VTT’s responsible persons met 
and discussed future actions to ensure appropriate 
safeguards procedures for the future. As a conse-
quence, the joint nuclear history of the university 
and the research centre in Otaniemi, and the cur-
rent possession and location of old reactor fuel 
including reactor graphite were reviewed.
3.1.6 The STUK site
Owing to outsourcing of staff and activities at the 
national waste receiving station of STUK, the re-
sponsibilities and boundaries at the operator were 
not clearly indicated since 2010. In 2011, STUK 
Nuclear Materials Section approved one new per-
son to be appointed responsible manager for nu-
clear safeguards at STUK and a deputy for this 
manager. STUK Nuclear Materials Section verified 
the physical inventory, inspected the site declara-
tion and basic technical characteristics during the 
inspection on 29 June 2012, and concluded that 
the actions that were required in the previous in-
spection protocol of 2010 have been accomplished. 
Thus, the operating unit at STUK fulfils the re-
quirements for national safeguards arrangements.
As the Government granted TVO a licence 
amendment for the final disposal of low and me-
dium level nuclear waste in the operating waste 
repository in Olkiluoto on 22 November 2012, also 
state-owned radioactive and nuclear waste that 
is under the control of STUK can be emplaced in 
the operating waste repository in Olkiluoto in the 
future.
3.1.7 The University of Helsinki site
STUK carried out its inspection to the University 
of Helsinki site on 29 February 2012 to verify the 
site declaration and the inventory.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that the University of 
Helsinki has complied with its nuclear safeguards 
obligations in 2012.
3.1.8 Minor nuclear material holders
In 2012 a few STUK inspections were focused on 
the minor nuclear material holders in order to as-
sure that the capabilities and procedures are ad-
equate. As a routine, STUK inspected the reports 
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from the minor nuclear material holders, but the in 
total two inspections to these minor holders’ prem-
ises were remarkably fewer than in previous years, 
as both in 2010 and in 2011 STUK inspected all 
the minor holders. In 2012 two new minor holders 
reported their activities. On 8 March 2012 STUK 
and the Commission inspected the physical inven-
tory of the University of Jyväskylä, MBA WDPJ. 
The inventory was correct, but the operator was 
requested to update the BTC.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that the minor nuclear 
material holders have complied with their nuclear 
safeguards obligations in 2012.
3.1.9 Front-end fuel cycle operators
STUK granted an operation licence to Norilsk 
Nickel Harjavalta for producing, storing and han-
dling uranium as a by-product of the nickel purifi-
cation process for an annual amount of less than 
10 metric tons in 2010. On 23 April 2012 STUK, 
the Commission and the IAEA carried out the first 
inspection to this operator and took samples from 
the solutions. The operator was requested to up-
date the BTC. In conjunction to this inspection the 
inventory of OMG Kokkola Chemicals was verified 
on 25 April 2012 by the same inspectorates.
During early 2011 STUK evaluated the li-
cence application of Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. 
to begin uranium production as a by-product at 
the Talvivaara nickel mine, which is located in 
Sotkamo. STUK made a statement to the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy about the radia-
tion and nuclear safety, security and safeguards is-
sues. STUK and the Commission carried out the 
first Design Information Verification inspection 
to Talvivaara in November 2011. The aim was to 
become familiar with the site staff and to agree 
on reporting procedures. In 2012 the IAEA and 
the Commission visited Talvivaara on 27 April 
2012 with the aim to get samples from the process. 
However, this was not yet possible at that time. 
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
and STUK visited Talvivaara in September, and 
later in November the mine areas under STUK’s 
control, because environmental releases from 
Talvivaara mine were analysed also by STUK. 
Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. received Commission ap-
proval for the uranium off-take agreements with 
Cameco in November 2011 and a further ratifica-
tion by the Commission in accordance with the 
Euratom Treaty in January 2012. On 1 March 
2012 the Finnish Government granted a licence in 
accordance with the Finnish nuclear legislation to 
Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. for the extraction of ura-
nium from the Talvivaara mine.
Before the plant is commissioned, STUK shall 
inspect that all relevant arrangements are in 
place, including the nuclear safeguards handbook 
and responsible persons for nuclear materials ac-
countancy. An environmental permit issued by 
the Regional State Administrative Agency is re-
quired before the extraction of uranium can start. 
According to the current estimates this may take 
place at the earliest in summer 2013.
3.1.10 The final disposal facility site 
for spent nuclear fuel
During the year 2012 STUK carried out four in-
terim inspections to the underground premises 
of the final disposal facility. The IAEA and the 
Commission joined one of these by means of a 
Design Information Verification. The IAEA inspect-
ed the underground premises, the shaft, and the 
ventilation technology building where there will be 
access routes to the underground premises.
Posiva updated its non-proliferation handbook 
in April and August 2012 to clarify and update the 
descriptions of Posiva’s safeguards practices. The 
update was approved by STUK in September 2012.
Several meetings were arranged between 
STUK, the Commission and the IAEA during the 
year 2012 in order to clarify and facilitate safe-
guards measures for the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel. These meetings were focused on the 
verification issues prior to spent fuel encapsula-
tion. This issue was discussed with Posiva’s design 
managers at the Safeguards-by-Design meeting 
on 29 March 2012, because it is important that 
designers are aware of the safeguards measures 
to be adapted to the facility at an early phase of 
facility development. As expected, Posiva submit-
ted the nuclear construction licence application for 
the disposal facility to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy in December 2012. In addition, 
Posiva submitted to STUK a plan for arranging the 
safeguards control, which is necessary to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons as required by 
the section 35 of the Nuclear Energy Degree on 31 
December 2012.
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3.1.11 Verification of spent fuel
STUK performed non-destructive assay (NDA) ver-
ification measurement campaigns on spent fuel el-
ements at both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPP in 2012. 
At the Olkiluoto campaign, 20 – 22 March, STUK 
used the gamma Burn-Up Verification method 
(GBUV), which is a High-Purity Germanium 
(HPGe) gamma spectrometric measurement of the 
spent fuel, through a collimator slit in the wall of 
the fuel pond. 36 assemblies were successfully veri-
fied during this campaign. All measured elements 
exhibited the expected fission product spectrum. 
The relative Cs-137 count rates were consistent 
with burn-up data.
Following the successful practice from the pre-
vious year, also the measurements at the Loviisa 
NPP were made in one single three day campaign, 
instead of two shorter two day campaigns. The 
campaign at Loviisa, 12 – 14 November, was car-
ried out with FORK equipment, which delivers a 
gross gamma signal from an ionisation chamber 
and a neutron count rate from a fission chamber. 
STUK’s FORK equipment is sometimes referred to 
as eFORK (enhanced FORK), because it incorpo-
rates a CdZnTe gamma spectrometer, however the 
CdZnTe spectrometer, as well as one of the ionisa-
tion chambers in the eFORK are currently out of 
order. Even though the instrument is not in perfect 
condition, 34 assemblies were successfully verified 
during this campaign. The measurements at the 
Loviisa NPP did not indicate any inconsistencies in 
the reporting by the operator.
3.1.12 Nuclear dual use items, export licences
In 2012 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued 
six licences for exporting nuclear process model-
ling software to France, Germany (2), Japan and 
Poland (2) and three licences for exporting nuclear 
technology (nuclear information) for a nuclear pow-
er plant to Japan, France and Sweden. In addition, 
the Ministry issued one licence to export a piece of 
equipment to France.
3.1.13 Transport of nuclear materials 
and nuclear waste
In 2012, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to Finland 
from Germany, Sweden and the Russian Federation 
(Table 1). In relation to these imports, STUK ap-
proved three transport plans and two transport 
package designs. Also an approval for special ar-
rangements to be applied in one of these transports 
was issued by STUK. Furthermore, STUK granted 
approvals for route alterations for a transport of 
fresh nuclear fuel and for special arrangements 
in a nuclear waste transport. In addition, STUK 
granted extra time for submissions of material re-
garding several approval applications.
STUK inspected two transports of fresh nuclear 
fuel during the year. The inspections were per-
formed in cooperation with the police who provided 
official assistance to STUK especially during the 
second inspection where STUK observed deficien-
cies in the licensee’s transport documents. On re-
quest by TVO, STUK participated in two meetings 
during the year, where STUK’s regulatory require-
ments in the new Guide YVL D.2 were discussed 
with both TVO and their nuclear fuel suppliers. 
Regarding the planned transports of natural ura-
nium from the Talvivaara mine, STUK took part 
in one meeting and one tabletop exercise that were 
organised by Talvivaara Sotkamo Oy and Cameco 
Corporation.
3.1.14 International transfers of 
nuclear material
In 2012, TVO reported to STUK about its interna-
tional fuel contracts, fuel transfers and fuel ship-
ments. STUK carried out an on-site inspection 
where TVO’s nuclear material accountancy on the 
fresh fuel imported in 2012 was verified against 
the original shipment documents, which cover the 
international transfers. The accountancy of the 
natural uranium in TVO’s possession but stored 
outside of the Olkiluoto NPP site was also inspect-
ed. Based on the findings, STUK concluded that 
TVO has complied with its safeguards obligations 
when purchasing the nuclear fuel and managing 
its international transfers.
3.2 The Finnish National Data 
Centre for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
3.2.1 International cooperation is the 
foundation of CTBT verification
During 2011 the Finnish National Data Centre 
(FiNDC) participated in meetings of the Working 
Group B (WGB) of the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO). WGB is a policy making 
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organ for the technical development of the veri-
fication regime. By participating in the work of 
WGB and its subsidiaries (workshops and expert 
groups), the FiNDC can provide technical expertise 
to the CTBTO, while also attending to the Finnish 
national interests.
In August a Linssi users’ group meeting was 
held in Freiburg, Germany. The Linssi data-
base system, developed jointly by STUK, Aalto 
University and Health Canada is an important 
part of the analysis capabilities of FiNDC. Several 
other NDCs have also adopted or are planning to 
adopt the Linssi database. During the year NDC 
staff from Australia, Austria and Germany visited 
FiNDC, to learn from and discuss the analysis pro-
cess in use at the FiNDC.
3.2.2 The analysis pipeline is a well 
established daily routine
The FiNDC continued developing its own moni-
toring system for the data received from the 
International Monitoring System’s network (IMS). 
The FiNDC routinely analyses all radionuclide 
measurement data generated at the IMS radionu-
clide stations across the world. The IMS network is 
still developing, and the number of operational air 
filter stations was 66 at the end of 2012 (at the fi-
nal stage there will be 80). The analysis pipeline is 
linked to the LINSSI database and equipped with 
an automated alarm system, to enable efficient and 
fully automated screening of the data.
The number of IMS stations equipped with 
radioxenon measurement capabilities was 30 at 
the end of 2012. Twelve IMS radioxenon sys-
tems where certified by the CTBTO at the end of 
2012. Radioxenon measurements are especially 
important for CTBT verification, because xenon, 
as a noble gas, may leak also from underground 
tests, which seldom release particulate matter. The 
operational stations generated more than 1000 
gamma and beta-gamma spectra per day for the 
FiNDC analysis pipeline to handle. The particulate 
pipeline is well established and has been running 
stably for many years, while FiNDC still needs 
some refinement of its xenon analysis capabilities.
3.3 International co-operation
The implementation of safeguards in Finland was 
addressed at several meetings with the IAEA and 
the Commission. In addition, STUK continued its 
participation in the ESARDA working groups and 
the steering committee meeting. STUK had strong 
influence in the ESARDA Executive Board and 
via ESARDA also at the INMM and IAEA confer-
ences. The head of STUK’s Security Technology 
Laboratory continued his term as the chairper-
son of the ESARDA Novel Approaches/Novel 
Technologies Working Group.
 The progress at the Olkiluoto 3 unit, which has 
been under construction since 2003, and the more 
current authorisation of the new nuclear facilities 
in 2010 have given STUK practical experience in 
implementing safety, security and safeguards to 
new nuclear facilities. Owing to this, STUK experts 
have been invited on several occasions to present 
guidance and to share their experiences. Some of 
this activity has been facilitated via the Finnish 
Support Programme to the IAEA, but there have 
also been other mechanisms available to contrib-
ute to the world-wide co-operation. In addition, the 
new facilities in the front-end and the back-end 
of the fuel cycle – i.e. the extraction of uranium 
in mining and milling and the development of the 
geological repository – have widened the capabili-
ties and scope of the Finnish national safeguards 
system.
Finland’s bilateral cooperation programmes in 
the area of non-proliferation are directed mainly 
towards our neighbouring countries outside the 
EU and are motivated by the continued need 
for enhancing the regional security environ-
ment. Accordingly, STUK continued its cooper-
ation programme with the Russian Federation. 
Collaboration with Ukraine in mutually beneficial 
areas was re-established in 2008 and an agreement 
about a programme was made between STUK 
and the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of 
Ukraine, since 2011 the State Nuclear Regulatory 
Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU). As per this 
agreement, capacity building at the SNRIU was 
continued in 2012.
In 2012 STUK contributed to the inter-insti-
tutional development cooperation programme of 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by supporting the 
Geological Survey of Finland in its tasks related 
to uranium mining and milling in Namibia and 
Zambia. In both states there are plans for new ura-
nium mining, but authorities need assistance when 
developing mining regulations. In the non-prolif-
eration regime the main tasks are related to the 
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ratification and implementation of the Additional 
Protocol.
3.3.1 Support programme to the IAEA
The Nuclear Materials Section of STUK coordi-
nates the Finnish Support Programme (FINSP) 
to IAEA safeguards. One of the main activities in 
2012 was hosting an IAEA training workshop for 
nuclear newcomers – countries pursuing a nucle-
ar power programme. The experiences of Finland 
were shared with the participants who represent-
ed 17 countries (Figure 9). The workshop was ar-
ranged at STUK and at Olkiluoto facilities on 8 
– 12 October 2012. The visit to the Olkiluoto 3 
construction site clarified the needs for early in-
teraction between the regulators and stakeholders 
during any large nuclear project. The information 
provided was useful for all countries, but every 
country has to develop its own models to co-operate 
with the IAEA in all areas of safety, security and 
safeguards (3S) and then adapt these in the na-
tional infrastructure and legislation as appropri-
ate.
Other activities included the development of 
a partial defect verification tool based on Passive 
Gamma Emission Tomography, training visits for 
IAEA experts, the development of safeguards for 
geological repositories, and the development of 
novel technologies for the IAEA.
3.3.2 Final disposal programme 
and the ASTOR group
In 2012, the group of experts for the Application of 
Safeguards to Geological Repositories (ASTOR) met 
at the IAEA in Vienna on 29 – 30 October. It was 
noted that the repository programmes in Sweden 
and in Finland have reached the licensing phase, 
and the safeguards measures are to be agreed to 
by all parties: facility designers, operators and the 
inspectorates. The IAEA and the Commission pre-
sented their safeguards approaches at the ASTOR 
meeting. In addition to the repository safeguards, 
verification of spent nuclear fuel prior to disposal 
was addressed, and a separate meeting on this 
issue was arranged on 31 October. A new task 
force consisting of the IAEA, the Commission, and 
Finnish and Swedish authorities and operators was 
founded during the ASTOR meeting. The first Low 
Level Liaison Committee (LLLC) Encapsulation 
Plant and Geological Repository (EPGR) Liaison 
Group meeting was scheduled for January 2013 
in Vienna and the 2013 ASTOR meeting for June 
2013 in Olkiluoto.
Novel technologies to be applied for safeguards 
Figure 9. Representatives from nuclear newcomer countries in Olkiluoto.
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purposes at this new type of facility were discussed 
during the year 2012. The prototype for the tomo-
graphic spent-fuel detector system was successfully 
tested at the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra. 
The tests are to be continued at the Finnish reposi-
tory facilities in real conditions. Two representa-
tives of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) visited the Olkiluoto repository site in May 
2012 (Figure 10) in order to improve awareness 
of geological repository safeguards in areas such 
as the continuity of knowledge, verification tech-
niques for spent fuel, containment surveillance, 
the design information questionnaire, and remote 
monitoring. Seismic monitoring experiences from 
Olkiluoto and Gorleben were presented and dis-
cussed during the German Support Programme 
visit to Finland in June 2012. The IAEA and the 
Commission participated in the technical visit. In 
October, two satellite imagery analysts of the IAEA 
made a site visit to the Olkiluoto facilities, both to 
the power plant and to the geological repository 
site. One of the new topics discussed was the pos-
sible future implementation of digital site declara-
tions. All these topics and the related visits are in 
the interests of the ASTOR group and the Finnish 
Support Programme.
3.3.3  Cooperation with the 
Rostechnadzor, Russia
Cooperation between Finnish and Russian authori-
ties, technical support organisations, industrial 
partners, and the status of the cooperation pro-
gramme were reviewed in the meeting in July. The 
demonstration of the spent fuel attribute tester 
(SFAT) measurement device for the Rostechnadzor 
was successfully carried out in 2008 at the Kola nu-
clear power plant. Since then a new computer was 
obtained for the system and software was installed 
and further steps were taken to organize the ship-
ment to the Ozersk Office of the Rostechnadzor in 
2012. This bilateral work complements the work 
done within the EU-financed TACIS project, which 
aims at improving the control of the handling of 
nuclear materials at the Mayak reprocessing plant.
3.3.4  Capacity building in Ukraine
From 2009 to 2010 the focus of the programme 
with Ukraine was on manufacturing and deliver-
ing a mobile laboratory vehicle for the use of the 
State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine 
(SNRIU). The mobile measuring laboratory, called 
Sophisticated ON-site Nuclide Identification 
(SONNI) enables identifying and analysing radio-
active sources and nuclear materials in the en-
vironment, at industrial facilities and in cases of 
threatening situations. The laboratory includes 
measuring, sampling, positioning and communica-
tion systems. Data can be transmitted in real time 
to the control centre, where the data can be en-
tered into a map system, thus providing real-time 
information for the management of the operations. 
At locations where the vehicle cannot have access, 
a portable application with the same functionality 
can be used. The capacity building in this area is 
financed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
The modern radiation measuring vehicle to-
gether with the portable application unit was 
donated to the IAEA and further to the SNRCU in 
Kiev in December 2010. Two one-week long educa-
tional sessions were organised in autumn of 2011 
to train the new crews and a field exercise was con-
ducted in December 2011. The work continued dur-
ing 2012 with field exercises and the provisioning 
of additional equipment and measurement devices. 
The technology was in full use during the EURO 
2012 football event, including the real-time expert 
support to the vehicle team operating in the field.
As continuation to this training, a new project 
was approved by the Commission to strengthen 
the SNRIU’s capabilities to provide independent 
radiation monitoring by using the mobile labora-
tory. The SNRIU capacity building continued 2012 
in the form of a mission to monitor the perfor-
mance of the monitoring teams during the EURO 
2012, the results of the work were presented at the 
EUROSAFE Forum in Brussels in November 2012. 
Also a workshop was held in November to plan for 
the practical exercises in 2013: joint surveys and 
inspections of public gatherings, of territories with 
medical institutions that use radiation and nuclear 
technologies, and around uranium mining and 
milling facilities. Special emphasis will be given to 
the use of the mobile laboratory as a part of normal 
regulatory activities.
In addition, another EU project was imple-
mented to enhance border control functions by 
provisioning conventional radiation detectors and 
new technical means for protection against chemi-
cal, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
threats. At the selected border stations between 
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Poland and Ukraine training was arranged for 30 
border control officers in November 2012.
3.3.5 Regulations for uranium 
mining and milling
STUK and the Geological Survey of Finland are 
cooperating under the financing instrument “inter-
institutional development and cooperation” which 
was launched in 2008 by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) to promote small-scale projects be-
tween government authorities and agencies. The 
Finnish public sector participates in development 
cooperation by cooperating with the partner coun-
tries’ public sector. The objective of the projects is to 
support capacity-building in the partner agencies. 
In June 2012 the Geological survey facilitated the 
IAEA interregional training course on “Supporting 
Uranium Exploration, Resource Augmentation and 
Production Using Advanced Techniques”. STUK 
and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
(MEE) participated and presented the current de-
velopment in its legislative framework in Finland. 
In August, the Geological Survey and STUK par-
ticipated in the OECD/NEA IAEA Uranium Group 
meeting in Kirovograd in Ukraine, giving the 
national report for Finland jointly. In the future, 
the Uranium Group will also concentrate on the 
regulations concerning uranium production and 
therefore the participation of regulatory bodies is 
desired. In addition to the official meeting focused 
on uranium resources, production and demand, 
the hosting country provided visits to the uranium 
mining and milling facilities (Figure 11). Thus, the 
participation in the working group provided STUK 
with a possibility to gain additional support and 
industrial viewpoints to the support for the regula-
tory control of the uranium production facilities. 
This gave important support to the continuation 
of the co-operation with Ukraine described in the 
previous chapter.
The Namupol project (Support for Drafting of 
Uranium Mining and Milling Policy, Legislation 
and Regulations and Development of Minerals 
Database) has its origins in a visit to Namibia 
by the Finnish Minister for Foreign Trade and 
Development in October 2008. In consultations 
with the Namibian minerals sector, half a dozen 
topics were identified and the need for a uranium 
production policy was considered to be the most 
pressing issue. Owing to the rapid upsurge in 
exploration for uranium in Namibia, the govern-
ment had been forced to impose a moratorium 
on the issuance of new licences. The Ministry of 
Mines and Energy of Namibia and the Geological 
Figure 10. NRC visit to the Olkiluoto geological repository.
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Survey of Finland submitted a project proposal to 
the MFA in April 2009. This was revised in 2009 
and radiation protection issues and nuclear regu-
lations were incorporated in the proposal. An as-
signment was received from the MFA in September 
2010 and the first policy workshop was held in 
Namibia in November 2010 with participants from 
the Namibian stakeholders and Finnish partners, 
Geological Survey, STUK, and the MFA. At this 
workshop, it was announced that Namibia needs 
to have regulation, not only for the uranium min-
ing and milling, but also for the whole nuclear 
fuel cycle. This raised the importance of non-
proliferation regulations since uranium production 
does not implicitly require safeguards measures 
like the fuel cycle facilities and related technology. 
The draft nuclear fuel cycle policy was written in 
2011, and two stakeholder workshops were held, in 
September and December 2011. The final guidance 
report from the Finnish side was delivered in May 
2012.
In Zambia, there are no current industrial ura-
nium mining activities, though uranium has been 
mined in the past. Currently uranium is stockpiled 
and overseen at one of the Zambian copper mines 
as by-product, and in addition one mining licence 
Figure 11. Uranium milling plant in Zholtie Vody, Ukraine.
application for uranium mining in sandstone has 
been submitted to the local authorities. The na-
tional legislation has recently been updated for the 
mining of uranium. However, the MFA identified 
the need to improve legislation and financed the 
Geological Survey of Finland and STUK to carry 
out a mission to Zambia in 2011 to assess the min-
ing, environmental and radiation protection legis-
lation and relevant competences at the responsible 
authorities, i.e. the Zambian Ministry of Mines 
and Minerals Development, the Environmental 
Management Agency and the Radiation Protection 
Authority. In addition, the preparedness to imple-
ment the Additional Protocol and integrated safe-
guards was addressed. The “Workshop on Different 
Aspects to the Uranium Production Cycle” was 
arranged in Lusaka, Zambia on 23 – 27 April 2012. 
The different stakeholders, including authorities, 
universities, non-governmental organisations and 
exploration and production companies, took ac-
tively part in the workshop. As a result, a ura-
nium working group was nominated to advice the 
Zambian government, in particular the Ministry of 
Mines. Participants from Finland, Namibia and the 
IAEA were also nominated to serve as advisors in 
the national working group.
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4 Human resources development
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK cover all typical measures of a 
State System of Accounting for and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and many other activi-
ties besides. The nuclear fuel cycle related activi-
ties, e.g. research and development activities not 
involving nuclear material or the manufacture of 
certain equipment as defined in the Additional 
Protocol have extended the scope of traditional 
safeguards. Nuclear safeguards on the national 
level are closely linked with the other functions 
of nuclear materials control and non-proliferation: 
licensing, export control, border control, transport 
control, combating illicit trafficking, the physical 
protection of nuclear materials, and monitoring 
compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT). The continuous analysis of the 
developments in the involved fields of both technol-
ogy and politics is a daily, multidisciplinary task at 
the STUK Nuclear Materials Section.
The personnel’s competence is systematically 
developed, taking into account the needs of the 
organisation and the wishes of the individuals (see 
Figure 12). Those aiming at an expert’s career are 
valued as highly as those interested in managerial 
duties. In 2012, one of the staff members partici-
pated in the specialist qualification for manage-
ment and leadership organised for state officials. 
The participants came from the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health and agencies under its supervi-
sion. Most of the education and training to develop 
management and leadership skills happens at the 
workplace. Two of the staff members participated 
in and completed the 5-week national course for 
nuclear safety and one of the inspectors attended 
the Euratom training course on European Nuclear 
Safeguards in Luxembourg. The IAEA course for 
nuclear newcomer states arranged in Finland 
served also as internal education and training. An 
internal two day seminar was held in March to 
prepare for the procedures needed to implement 
safeguards at the disposal facility for spent nuclear 
fuel.
The RADAR project to upgrade radiation moni-
toring systems at Finnish border crossing stations 
was launched in 2009 and will run up to 2014. 
The aim of the project is to modernise radiation 
monitoring equipment at border crossing stations 
and to educate the personnel at the stations. The 
project is run in cooperation with Finnish Customs, 
the end-user of the equipment. Antti Hannula was 
employed at STUK as trainee during the summer 
to assist the instrumentation at the border control 
stations. The main outcome of 2012 was the pro-
curement of the Kotka-Hamina harbour system, 
which will be installed in early 2013. The system’s 
novel architecture facilitates quick response in 
case of alarms.
In addition to being the responsible section for 
the above described areas, the personnel of the 
Nuclear Materials Section assist other sections in 
response to any incidents that may include nuclear 
materials or require their expertise for any other 
reason. Some of the Nuclear Materials Section 
staff are also part of the pool of Experts-on-Duty, 
who receive the notifications for incidents and 
are responsible for initiating STUK’s response. 
In 2012, the general cost-efficiency requirements 
affected STUK’s ability for immediate responses. 
The public and media service and the National 
Data Centre for CTBT were reduced to office-hours 
service and the resources to have an inspector 
on alert were reduced. One of the staff members 
worked half-time for emergency preparedness and 
another person transferred to the Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation department at the end of the year.
The distribution of the working days of the 
Nuclear Materials Section in the different duty ar-
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Figure 12. The staff of the Nuclear Materials Section.
The staff of STUK Nuclear Materials Section. All section staff participate in the core safeguards tasks. 
Additionally, each person has some special areas of expertise to focus on.
Mr. Tapani Honkamaa Senior Inspector The RADAR project, FINSP to the IAEA safeguards
Mr. Timo Ansaranta Inspector Control of operators’ competence at facilities
Mr. Antti Hannula Trainee The RADAR project
Ms. Ritva Kylmälä Assistant 
Ms. Elina Martikka Section Head Management
Ms. Anna Lahkola Senior Inspector Transport of nuclear materials and nuclear waste, database of nuclear 
materials
Mr. Mikael Moring Senior Inspector Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT, safeguards for final disposal
Mr. Antero Kuusi Inspector Databases, non-destructive assay
Mr. Olli Okko Senior Inspector Safeguards of research and development, final disposal
Mr. Marko Hämäläinen Senior Inspector Inspection coordination, Additional Protocol related matters
eas is presented in Figure 13. Most of the working 
days are subject to a charge from the stakeholders. 
As seen in Figure 13, the duty areas are divided 
into those of direct oversight and inspections (basic 
operations), to support functions including main-
tenance and development work for the regulatory 
functions, to consultancy including e.g. internation-
al cooperation financed by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs or the EU, and to the RADAR project, which 
supports Finnish Customs. State budgetary fund-
ing constitutes less than 10 % of the total funding 
of the Nuclear Materials Section.
At the request of the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy, an international team of senior 
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Distribution of working days
102; 36 %
33; 11 %
25; 9 %
Direct oversight and inspections     
Budgetary funding
Support functions
Expert services
22; 8 %
104; 36 %
RADAR project
Figure 13. The distribution of working days of the Nuclear Materials Section in the different duty areas.
safety experts met representatives of STUK 15 – 26 
October 2012 to conduct an Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service (IRRS) mission. The purpose of the 
peer review was to review the Finnish regulatory 
framework for nuclear and radiation safety. One 
of the general recommendations to improve STUK 
practices in the IAEA final report was that “STUK 
should further enhance the effectiveness of its in-
spection activities by developing a formal qualifica-
tion programme for inspectors, making more use 
of and clarifying the processes for unannounced 
and reactive inspections, and extending the use 
of the graded approach for planning and conduct-
ing inspections across all regulated facilities and 
activities”. Although the IRRS is not focused on 
safeguards, the qualification programme for safe-
guards inspectors and facility representatives was 
also addressed during the visit at STUK. Moreover, 
two staff members of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) visited STUK in September in 
order to familiarise themselves with the current 
qualification requirements for safeguards person-
nel both at the authority organisation and at the 
facilities. Such competence assurance will be one of 
the cornerstones of future work and an important 
part of the new strategy to be implemented with 
the reduced resources of the Nuclear Materials 
Section.
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5 Conclusions
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures and activities with 62 inspection days and 
42 inspections. The implementation of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inte-
grated safeguards began in Finland on 15 October 
2008. After 2009 the number of IAEA and European 
Commission inspection days has been somewhat 
higher, because of the higher number on random 
interim inspections, partly owing to new stake-
holders to be inspected. Since 2010 the number of 
inspection days annually has been close to 20. The 
implementation of the IAEA integrated safeguards 
reduces the total number of annual routine inspec-
tions days of the international inspectorates, but it 
includes short notice random inspections. In order 
to be present at all of the short notice IAEA inspec-
tions STUK has had preparedness to have a daily 
on-the-alert inspector.
In 2012 STUK performed 25 safeguards inspec-
tions at the Finnish nuclear power plants (NPP), 
nine at the Loviisa NPP and 16 at the Olkiluoto 
NPP. The Commission and the IAEA took part in 
14 and 13 of these inspections, respectively. STUK 
performed two non-destructive assay measure-
ment campaigns, one at the Loviisa NPP and one 
at the Olkiluoto NPP. In 2012 STUK carried out 
two inspections to the minor nuclear material 
holders. At other facilities, the Commission took 
part in the physical inventory verification at the 
University of Jyväskylä and at the VTT research 
reactor, and together with the IAEA in inspections 
to the front-end facilities in Harjavalta, Kokkola 
and Talvivaara, as well as in the design informa-
tion verification of the geological repository at the 
final disposal site at Olkiluoto. The total number of 
safeguards inspections in 2012 was 42 for STUK, 
21 for the Commission, and 18 for the IAEA. 
The IAEA sent its safeguards statements to the 
Commission, which amended them with its own 
conclusions and forwarded them to STUK. The con-
clusions by the Commission were in line with the 
IAEA’s remarks as well as with STUK’s own find-
ings; there were no outstanding questions by the 
IAEA or the Commission at the end of 2012.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards in-
spection activities continued to demonstrate that 
the Finnish licence holders take good care of their 
nuclear materials. There were no indications of un-
declared materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with 
the licence holders’ declarations. Organisational 
safeguards procedures and nuclear material ac-
countancy were remarked on for one of the stake-
holders during the year. Neither the IAEA nor 
the Commission made any remarks nor did they 
present any required actions based on their inspec-
tions. By their nuclear materials accountancy and 
control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK 
to fulfil its own obligations under the international 
agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards and 
non-proliferation.
In 2012 STUK’s Nuclear Materials Section co-
operated closely with the IAEA order to share 
experiences and train authorities’ staff in coun-
tries that are aiming at nuclear programmes i.e. 
uranium production or nuclear energy. STUK co-
operated with the Finnish Customs to offer expert 
advice in the development of radiation monitoring 
at borders, including training for Customs officers.
A major goal of all current Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related activities 
is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. To reach 
this goal, major steps have to be taken in the politi-
cal arena, and an important prerequisite for posi-
tive political action is that the verification system 
of the CTBTO is functioning and able to provide 
assurance to all parties that it is impossible to 
make a clandestine nuclear test without getting 
detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role 
in the common endeavour so that the verification 
system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection 
task. While still incomplete, the verification system 
has already demonstrated its ability to detect nu-
clear tests.
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7 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement 
concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions Group of 
the Council of the European 
Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to 
Geological Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical 
Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear 
(such as in “protective 
measures taken against 
CBRN weapons or hazards”)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization
DIQ
Design Information 
Questionnaire
DIV
Design Information 
Verification
DU
Depleted uranium
eFORK
enhanced FORK with a 
CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer 
(see FORK)
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards 
Research and Development 
Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment 
according to the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193), 
(2) Fuel Assembly
FiNDC
Finnish National Data 
Centre for the CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with 
gross gamma and neutron 
detection
GBUV
Gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
Global Initiative for 
Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HEU
High-enriched uranium
HPGe
High-Purity Germanium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy 
Agency
IMS
International Monitoring 
System (of the CTBTO)
ITU
Institute of Transuranium 
Elements in Karlsruhe
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INFCIRC
Information Circular 
(IAEA document type, eg. 
INFCIRC/193, Safeguards 
Agreement, or INFCIRC/140, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty)
IPPAS
International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service
IRRS
Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service
IS
Integrated Safeguards
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory 
Service
ITWG
International Technical 
Working Group for combating 
illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive 
materials
JRC
The Joint Research Centre
KMP
Key Measurement Point
LEU
Low-enriched uranium
LINSSI
an SQL database for gamma-
ray spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
MEE
Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy
MFA
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/140, 
“Non-Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
NRC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission
OECD/NEA
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development /Nuclear 
Energy Agency
Onkalo
Underground rock 
characterisation facility (for 
the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel)
PIT
Physical Inventory Taking
PIV
Physical Inventory 
Verification
PSP
Particular Safeguards 
Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical 
Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of 
the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory 
in the CTBT IMS network 
hosted by STUK (FIL07)
SA
Subsidiary Arrangements
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SNRCU
State Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission of Ukraine
SNRI
Short Notice Random 
Inspection
SNRIU
State Nuclear Regulatory 
Inspectorate of Ukraine
SNUICA
Short notice, unannounced 
inspection, complementary 
access, on-alert inspector
SSAC
State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority
Th
Thorium
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U
Uranium
UI
Unannounced Inspection
UNSC
United Nations Security 
Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of 
Finland
WGB
Working Group B (of the 
CTBTO)
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Table 1. Summary of nuclear fuel receipts in 2012.
To From FA LEU (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 Germany 110 19 189
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 (1/2) Sweden 60 10 360
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 (2/2) Sweden 56 9 673
Loviisa NPP, WL0V Russian Federation 90 11 322
 FA = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium. 
APPENDIX 1 Nuclear materials in Finland in 2012
Table 2. Fuel assemblies at 31 December 2012.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 1 249/669 213 254 1 038
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 1 231/659 204 720 968
Olkiluoto, spent fuel 
storage, W0LS
6 556/6 556 1 110 318 9 306
Loviisa NPP, WL0V 5 199/4 507 603 177 5 529
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) FAs in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa NPP 313 FAs and Olkiluoto NPP 500 FAs per reactor)
Table 3. Total amounts of nuclear material at 31 December 2012.
MBA Natural U (kg) Enriched U* (kg) Depleted U (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
W0L1 – 213 300 – 1039 –
W0L2 – 204 764 – 968 –
W0LS – 1 110 318 – 9 306 –
WL0V – 603 178 – 5 529 –
WRRF 1 511 60.098 0.002 < 0.001 0.048
WFRS 0.551 0.537 105.11 ~ 0 0.178
WKK0 2 709.7 – – – –
WNNH 2 623.55 – – – –
WHEL 49.716 0.293 20.010 0.003 2.942
Minor holders  0.061 0.00116  1 314.5 ~ 0  0.163
MBA = material balance area, WRRF = VTT FiR1/VTT Processes, WFRS = STUK, WKK0 = OMG Kokkola Chemicals, WNNH = Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta, WHEL = 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki, U = uranium. *) Less than 150 g of high-enriched uranium, mainly used in detectors.
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APPENDIX 2 Safeguards field activities in 2012
General information Inspections Inspection  person days
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
WRRF 7 February Interim inspection, site 0 0 1 0 0 2
WHEL 29 February PIV + site 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 6 March Interim inspection C&S, DIV, site, RDT 0 1 1 0 1 1
WDPJ 8 March PIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
W0LF 27 March As built DIV, site 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 27 March Interim inspection 0 0 3 0 0 3
W0L1 13  April SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
WNNH 23 April PIV + IAEA technical visit 1 1 1 1 1 1
WKK0 25 April PIV + IAEA technical visit 1 1 1 1 1 1
WTAL 27 April Technical visit 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1, W0L2 30 April Pre-PIT 2 2 2 2 2 2
W0L1 13 May OL1 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
Outokumpu 
Stainless Oy 29 May PIV, system inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L2 2 June OL2 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0LF 13 June As built DIV 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 12–14 June PIV 3 3 3 3 3 3
TVO, Helsinki 
Headquarter 29 June
International nuclear material 
transfers (accountancy and control) 0 0 1 0 0 1
WFRS 29 June DIV, site 0 0 2 0 0 2
WL0V 1–2 August Pre-PIT 1 1 1 2 2 2
WL0V 10–12 August Transfer cask verification (×2) 2 2 2 2 2 2
WL0V 3 September Transfer cask verification 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 5 September Transfer cask verification, LO1 core verification 1 1 2 1 1 2
WRRF 6 September PIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
W0LF 6 September As built DIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L3 6 September DIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 28–29 September LO2 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 9 October Interim inspection 0 0 3 0 0 3
W0LS 17 October SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 30–31 October Post-PIT, DIV 1 1 1 2 2 3
W0LF 11 December As built DIV 0 0 1 0 0 1
NDA MEASUREMENTS
W0L1 20–22 March GBUV 0 0 1 0 0 9
WL0V 12–14 October Fork 0 0 1 0 0 9
TOTAL 18 21 42 20 23 62
Note: At the Olkiluoto NPP, inspections are counted per MBA. MBA = material balance area, PIV = Physical Inventory Verification, CV = Core Verification,  
CA = Complementary Access, ES = Environmental Sampling, NM = nuclear material, SFAT/eFORK/GBUV = methods of non-destructive assay.
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APPENDIX 3 International agreements and national 
legislation relevant to nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements concern-
ing safeguards of nuclear materials and other nu-
clear items at the end of 2012 in Finland (Finnish 
Treaty Series, FTS):
1. The Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990 
as amended.
2. The Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 
1988/161 as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency in Implementation of Article III, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 
1997. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
5. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ire-
land, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered 
into force on 30 April 2004.
6. The Treaty establishing the European Atom-
ic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 
March 1957:
•	 Regulation	No	5,	amendment	of	the	list	in	
Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
•	 Regulation	No	9,	article	197,	point	4	of	the	
Euratom Treaty, on determining concentra-
tions of ores, 2 February 1960.
7. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005, 
8 February 2005
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up 
a Community regime for the control of exports, 
transfer, brokering, and transit of dual use 
items.
9. The Agreement with the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III 
and X expired on 20 February 1999.
10. The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 ex-
pired on 1.12.2004.
11. The Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70). Articles 1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
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12. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland 
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear ma-
terials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/83).
13. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Cana-
da and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear 
materials, equipment, facilities and information 
transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 
43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by 
the Agreement with the Government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic En-
ergy, 6 October 1959 as amended.
14. The Agreement on implementation of the Agree-
ment with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
15. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Aus-
tralia concerning the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the Government of Aus-
tralia and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity concerning transfer of nuclear material 
from Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community.
16. The Agreement for Cooperation with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the USA.
17. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(FTS 15/2001). This treaty was ratified by Fin-
land in 2001, but will not enter into force before 
it is ratified by all 44 states listed in Annex II of 
the treaty.
